Should desperate volunteers be included in randomised controlled trials? Abstract
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) sometimes recruit participants who are desperate to receive the experimental treatment. Some claim this practice is unethical for at least three reasons. The first is that the notion of equipoise, which is often used as a justification for running a RCT, is subjective and value-based. Desperate volunteers are clearly not in equipoise and it is their values that should take precedence. The second is that clinicians who enter patients onto trials are disavowing their therapeutic obligation to deliver the best treatment to patients; they are following trial protocols rather than delivering individualised care. Research is not treatment; its ethical justification is different. Consent is crucial. This leads to the third reason: desperate volunteers do not give a proper consent; they are, in effect, coerced. We begin our reply by advocating a notion of equipoise based on, first, expert knowledge and, second, widely shared values.
Where such collective, expert equipoise exists there is a prima facie case for a RCT. Next we argue that trial entry does not involve clinicians' disavowing their therapeutic obligation; individualised care based on whims and fancies is not in patients' best interest. Finally, we argue that where equipoise exists it is acceptable to limit access to experimental agents. In the cases desperate volunteers are not coerced because their desperation does not translate into a right to receive what they desire.
Introduction
The following quotes come from people involved in a recent neonatal randomised controlled trial (RCT) who were interviewed as part of a qualitative sub-study. 1 The first is from a mother who gave consent:
"I remember saying to him, 'Oh great, great, like some effing placebo' is what I said to him; so, no, I totally understood that idea, so I was kind of glad [because the baby received active treatment.]"
The second is from a clinician:
"… it's easy for someone to put a gun to your head and say it's your decision. And the gun being that their baby is born and is damaged and is needing a lot of resuscitation and here we are saying, look there's a trial happening and this is the only thing available, and there's nothing else available…"
The quotes illustrate the desperate volunteer problem: RCTs sometimes recruit patients (or their proxies) who are desperate to be placed on one particular arm of the study. They consent because the treatment they desire is available only through that study and are disappointed if randomised to the "wrong" arm. The problem arises usually where the RCT is investigating a new treatment into a serious or terminal illness where current treatment options are limited.
Some argue directly that it is unethical to recruit desperate volunteers to RCTs. 2;3 Others imply it is unethical by arguing that it is right to recruit only participants who are indifferent between treatment arms. 4 The issue has been discussed most in relation to patients with serious and terminal illness including Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 3;5 and variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). 6 In the United Kingdom, parents of two young men with vCJD challenged in court the decision of doctors not to use a drug that was still in the early (animal) research stage. 6 This opens the possibility that desperate volunteers could similarly challenge a placebo-controlled RCT.
In this article we defend the recruitment of desperate volunteers into RCTs provided the condition of equipoise is met. As this is a term used in different ways we first need to set out what we mean by it. We then set out our argument in more detail and examine it in relation to the arguments of those who believe it unethical to recruit desperate volunteers.
(Throughout this discussion we shall use the term "equipoise"; others prefer "uncertainty". 7;8 This distinction makes no difference of substance here.)
Equipoise
It is often said that for a RCT to be ethical a condition of equipoise must prevail. Roughly this means that there should be no grounds to prefer any particular arm of the trial. Early discussion of equipoise focused on whether the condition should pertain to each individual clinician. [9] [10] [11] The problem is that clinicians often have hunches, 
Criticism 1: Equipoise is subjective and value-based
Being in equipoise implies being uncertain which of two or more treatments is better and, therefore, which to choose. However, there are ambiguities here in the notions of uncertainty, being better and choice. Let us take these in turn.
Uncertainty
RCTs are powered to avoid error to a certain degree. 
Choice
Uncertainty about a treatment's efficacy does not necessarily translate to uncertainty about whether one would choose it. Even if one had no idea whether a treatment might turn out to be efficacious one might still want it. Typically this would happen where one's current situation is dire and a treatment offers hope, distant though it may be. These ambiguities render equipoise incapable of providing justification for RCTs. Indeed, on one account, this was Fried's point when he originated the term "equipoise". 20
Criticism 2: Equipoise disguises the therapeutic misconception
The opponents of equipoise say that when clinicians enter patients into RCTs they disavow the therapeutic obligation to recommend and deliver the best treatment. This is because such clinicians no longer deliver individualised care. Instead they are committed to a trial regime. This has a number of effects, for example:
• Such regimes are focused on particular endpoints that are of import to the researchers but may not be of the same import to the patient. A clinician might, for example, see that some side effects are particularly important to a patient (as tremor would be to a concert pianist, for example) and can treat accordingly.
In a RCT, the patient's values are set to one side.
• A clinician committed to a trial regime cannot make subtle alterations in dosage.
• She cannot follow her personal belief that the balance of evidence favours one treatment rather than another.
• Participants in RCTs may be subject to (clinically) unnecessary additional procedures.
• Participants in RCTs may receive inert and pointless placebos.
Opponents of equipoise argue that its use reflects and reinforces a false identification of research with treatment (the "therapeutic misconception"). 10;11;21-25 Being "in equipoise" is supposed to reflect a clinician's being unsure of the best action for a patient: the options include trial entry or individualised care. Equipoise, insofar as it means anything, simply reflects a general lack of knowledge of the effects of treatment on a whole class of patients; in practice, clinicians will always have some notion of which course of action they would prefer to take with a particular patient, including the need for subtle alterations of dose and so forth.
Thus, because equipoise is subjective and value-based it cannot provide an objective standard that justifies the running of RCTs.
Furthermore, equipoise amongst clinicians about the effectiveness of a treatment cannot justify disavowing the therapeutic obligation. RCTs can still be justified, but their justification will be based on a different set of principles to those of treatment. 10;26;27 Where beneficence and the best interest of the patient are central to treatment, autonomy and informed consent are central to research. It is permissible to disavow the therapeutic obligation provided the risks are acceptable and, especially, provided the patient gives informed consent.
Criticism 3: equipoise is used to justify coerced trial entry
Desperate volunteers provide a vivid illustration of the inadequacy of equipoise.
To desperate volunteers, the setting aside of the therapeutic obligation is clear; they strongly believe there is a better alternative than the one being presented to them by their clinician.
Similarly, the failure of fully informed consent is clear; their consent is not truly voluntary; they are effectively coerced into trial entry. Their subsequent anger at this injustice is shown by their campaigns and court cases. 5 We shall argue that at least in some cases it is not unjust to recruit desperate volunteers. We do this by tackling the three criticisms.
Reply to criticism that equipoise is subjective and value based
Our first task is to suggest a conception of equipoise that is robust enough to do some work in justifying RCTs. The criticism that it cannot do this arises from three ambiguities.
The first ambiguity concerns uncertainty: the emergence of trends undermines equipoise for present patient decisions before we reach the level of statistical certainty necessary for policy decisions.
However, Yusuf looked at the data from a number of studies into cardiac treatments. 28 Early trends were often deceptive. In one study, aspirin appeared little better than placebo as a treatment following a heart attack when 3000 patients had been recruited. What of the second ambiguity concerning the meaning of a treatment's being better? The DMEC might be in equipoise over certain endpoints but these might not be of import to the patient.
However, this disjunction in values is likely to be rare. In most cases, the endpoints of value to researchers, such as disease-free survival, will also be of great value to patients. Were this not the case then the desperate volunteer problem would be echoed in many RCTs; for example, it would be commonplace for people to complain about the group into which they are randomised. There seems no evidence for this. 30 In those rare cases of potential significant disagreement over the value of endpoints researchers will need to ensure that participant equipoise is present (as in the mastectomy/lumpectomy and concert pianist examples; also see a case described by Lilford 31 ). In the case of desperate volunteers, however, their concerns are with survival and quality of life; these are matters which researchers will hope the experimental agent tested in the relevant RCT will improve. is a tendency to prefer placebo trials in such situations. 35 Like many, we believe this to be unethical and to contravene the Helsinki accord. [36] [37] [38] Entering patients onto a trial using placebos in this way would certainly violate the therapeutic obligation. However, when correctly used, placebos represent the best alternative treatment. 17 Provided this is so, clinicians unsure of which treatment is best are acting both in the best interest of the patient and in the interest of ending uncertainty when they enter patients into RCTs. try telling an actuary that we are all individuals. 43 The bizarre outcome of the "individualised care" argument is that, to paraphrase Smithell's famous dictum, it appears unethical to give an unproven treatment to half my patients, but ethical to give it to all of them. 44 To summarise: we have suggested that equipoise can be robust enough to provide a prima facie case for a RCT. We have denied that
RCTs necessarily involve a disavowal of the therapeutic obligation.
Nonetheless, a central element of the case against the involvement of desperate volunteers in RCTs remains. This is that they are effectively coerced into taking part. Relatedly, given that equipoise is a function of values, shouldn't the values of participants prevail through the mechanism of (voluntary) consent? 4 It is to this we now turn.
Reply to criticism that equipoise is used to justify coerced trial entry
In the first place, we should note that our argument constitutes a Thus one reason for the difference between clinicians and desperate volunteers is that the latter's hope for a cure obscures the reality. As one parent we spoke to put it, "
We fully understood what he wanted to do in terms of treatment … we fully understood the side effects if there was going to be any, or the risks involved, but obviously whatever anyone tells you all you listen to is that your child is damaged …"
Typically, from the standpoint of collective equipoise it will be important to discover whether treatments are effective, to allocate resources effectively, to avoid long-term side effects and so forth.
From the standpoint of the desperate volunteer these considerations will be of little import: they will clutch at straws to avoid the harm they face now. RCTs limit their options; the straw they are forced to clutch is trial entry. Is this constrained consent justifiable?
Consent to research is generally thought to have two main functions.
The first is the protection of the patient against either exposure to a harmful treatment or denial of a therapeutic one. There is here a consequentialist counter-argument; 5 desperate volunteers will find ways around the restrictions imposed by RCTs by, for example, mixing their drugs together to ensure they get at least some of the active treatment. RCTs will then be less scientifically valid than other approaches. This is perhaps more a practical than a moral consideration. In most hospital based trials it could not occur.
However, it should focus the minds of the researchers to the moral issue. Our belief is that, in the desperate volunteer situation, if the question can be answered by an alternative to the RCT then it should be. If an RCT is impractical because of desperate volunteer resistance then, in effect, the question cannot be answered to an extent that would undermine collective clinical equipoise.
Hence there are two types of argument in favour of recruiting desperate volunteers to RCTs despite the fact that they would desire an alternative were it made available. The first is, loosely, deontological: that people do not have a right to unproven therapy.
(By "unproven" we mean that clinical equipoise exists in relation to that therapy and the existing best alternative [s] .) The second is more consequentialist: disallowing RCTs where there are desperate volunteers would make it difficult to generate and test new treatments in areas such as neonatology and end of life care where desperation is commonplace.
Closing remarks
Collective, expert equipoise is a sine qua non for setting up a RCT. In other words, there must be doubt in the clinical community about whether a new treatment is better overall than standard treatment.
Personal equipoise on behalf of clinicians and participants is desirable and will be present in many cases. However, personal equipoise should be seen as a prima facie criterion only.
As a prima facie criterion, personal equipoise is defeasible. Collective equipoise trumps personal equipoise and, where it exists, there is a case for a RCT. Nonetheless, the prima facie criterion sets an important limit. If possible, trials should avoid recruiting desperate volunteers. 31 However, as we have argued, there will be situations in which scientific investigation will require randomisation and the recruitment of desperate volunteers.
In those situations where desperate volunteers are recruited we should seek to minimise the negative effects, for example by using unequal randomisation in favour of the experimental arm in the trial design. 51;52
Conclusion
It can be ethical to run RCTs that recruit desperate volunteers provided there is collective, expert equipoise, throughout the course of the trial (as assessed by the DMEC and TSC).
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